The effect of ownership structure on leverage decision: new evidence from Chinese listed firms by Liu, Qigui et al.
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
Faculty of Commerce - Papers (Archive) Faculty of Business and Law 
1-1-2011 
The effect of ownership structure on leverage decision: new evidence from 
Chinese listed firms 
Qigui Liu 
University of Wollongong, ql945@uow.edu.au 
Gary Tian 
University of Wollongong, gtian@uow.edu.au 
Xiaoming Wang 
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/commpapers 
 Part of the Business Commons, and the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Liu, Qigui; Tian, Gary; and Wang, Xiaoming: The effect of ownership structure on leverage decision: new 
evidence from Chinese listed firms 2011, 254-276. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/commpapers/797 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
The effect of ownership structure on leverage decision: new evidence from 
Chinese listed firms 
Abstract 
This paper examines the effect of state control and ownership structure on the leverage decision of firms 
listed in the Chinese stock market. Our results show that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have higher 
leverage ratios than non-SOEs, and SOEs in regions with a poorer institutional environment have higher 
leverage ratios than SOEs in better regions. We also show that the largest shareholding (the percentage of 
shares held by the largest shareholder) in the SOEs has a negative relationship with the leverage ratio, 
while the largest shareholding in non-SOEs has a non-linear relationship with the short-term and long-term 
debt ratios. Finally, this study also shows that the share split reform and the improvement of institutional 
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This paper examines the effect of state control and ownership structure on 
leverage decision of firms listed in Chinese stock market. Our results show that 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have higher leverage ratios than non-SOEs, and 
SOEs in regions with a poorer institutional environment have higher leverage 
ratios than SOEs in better regions. We also show that the largest shareholding 
(percentage of shares held by the large shareholder) in the SOEs has a negative 
relationship with the leverage ratio, while largest shareholding in Non-SOEs has a 
non-linear relationship with short-term and long-term debt ratio. Finally, this 
study also shows that share split reform and the improvement of institutional 
environment both weaken the negative relationship and strengthens the positive 
relationship between largest shareholding and leverage of SOEs and Non-SOEs to 
some extent. This paper documents how the financing behaviour of SOEs is more 
influenced by government intervention, while the financing behaviour of non-
SOEs is more market oriented. 
Keywords: capital structure; ownership structure; state ownership; largest 
shareholding; regional institutional development 
JEL Classification: G30, G32 
Introduction 
This paper investigates the effect of state control and ownership structure on the 
leverage decision of Chinese firms. Agency cost theory, as proposed by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), suggests that agency cost and ownership structure have important 
impacts on a firm’s capital structure. One recent stream of the capital structure 
literature has examined how shareholders’ rights affect a firm’s capital structure 
decisions (Friend and Lang, 1988; Berger, 1997). However, this body of literature 
mainly focuses on firms in the US and UK, where ownership is dispersed among 
many external small shareholders and control is concentrated in the hands of 
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managers from inside the business (Berle and Means, 1932). These features mean that 
the predominant agency cost arises between shareholders and managers, due to the 
separation of ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Recent studies 
suggest that ownership concentration in hands of a few large shareholders is more 
prevalent in the corporate world outside the US and UK, especially in many transition 
economies such as China (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens, 2000; Faccio and Lang, 
2002). Firms in these countries have a different ownership structure compared to their 
counterparts in the US, including high ownership concentration and a high proportion 
of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and they also function in a specific institutional 
environment. Taking account of these variables, this paper argues that the specific 
character of ownership structure, control and institutional environment has a quite 
distinct influence on firms’ capital structures. 
The investigation of the relationships between state ownership, the largest 
shareholding, institutional development and the capital structure decisions of Chinese 
SOEs and non-SOEs is important because, as a typical transition economy, and as the 
largest developing country, China has distinct institutional features. 
The first important institutional feature is that state ownership dominates listed 
companies in China (Sun and Tong, 2003). Since 2005 when Chinese government 
started to implement share split reform, the percentage of state ownership started to 
decline. However, government still maintains its ownership control and exerts great 
influence on the capital structure of Chinese listed firms. Second, similar to many 
other Asian countries, listed companies in China have a highly concentrated 
ownership structure, so ownership structure, especially the largest shareholding also 
have an important influence on the capital structure choices of Chinese listed firms as 
it can affect agency incentives (Booth et al., 2001). Thirdly, the investor protection 
legal system in China is still imperfect, for example, China does not provide 
comprehensive laws and regulations regarding external investors, or cannot 
effectively implement the existing laws of administrating operation of the corporate 
or securities markets (Kaoto and Long, 2005). Finally, the share split reform, which 
was a major event in Chinese capital market and also markedly changed the 
ownership structure of Chinese listed firms, so this event provide us a quite new 
dataset to examine the influence of ownership structure on capital structure decision 
before and after the reform
1
.  Therefore, China will provide unique dataset to 
examine the effect of state ownership and ownership structure on capital structure 
decision under weak legal protection of minority shareholders. 
Prior research indicates a link between ownership structure, institutional 
development and the leverage decision of a firm. For example, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1994) suggest that direct state ownership is often associated with the pursuit of 
political objectives at the expense of other stakeholders in the firm. Consistent with 
their view, Dewenter and Malatesta (2001), using a sample of the world largest 500 
firms, indicate that SOEs are more highly leveraged and perform less well than 
comparable private firms. The literature also shows that a country’s development of 
its legal and institutional frameworks affects local firms’ capital structure decisions. 
La Porta et al. (1997; 1998; 2002) found that the source of laws and their 
implementation quality have a significant impact on corporate financing decision 
making. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) conducted an empirical analysis by 
using a sample from 30 developing and developed countries, and found that when the 
legal system is inefficient or costly to use, short-term debt is more likely to be 
employed than long-term debt, because banks under an inefficient legal system prefer 
to issue short-term loans to reduce credit risk.  
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There are also literatures investigating the relationship between state ownership, 
institutional development and leverage of Chinese firms in recent years. For example, 
Li et al. (2009) investigated the relationship between ownership, institutional 
development and the leverage decision of Chinese non-listed firms, and found that 
state ownership was positively associated with firms’ leverage capability and access 
to long-term debt, and firms in better developed regions were associated with reduced 
use of long-term debt. Firth et al. (2009) investigated the financial decision of 
Chinese non-listed private firms, and he found that having the state as a minority 
owner helps private firms obtain bank loans, especially for large firms and firms 
located in regions with a less developed banking sector. Kasseeah (2008) investigated 
the financial decision of Chinese listed manufacture firms, and he found that the 
leverage of firms in high FDI recipient and firms who receive more state subsidy is 
not influenced by profitibality.  
Despite prior research, questions remain regarding: 1) how state ownership and 
the largest shareholding affect firms’ capital structure, 2) whether these factors have 
different influences on SOEs (which the state ultimately controls) and non-SOEs 
(which non-state entities ultimately control), 3) how the interaction between the 
largest shareholding and institutional development influences the capital structure of 
SOEs and non-SOEs, and 4) whether share split reform influences firm’s capital 
structure decisions.. This paper provides new evidence to answer these questions, 
using a recent panel data of Chinese SOEs and non-SOEs. 
This paper contributes to the relevant literature along the following dimensions: 
first, our paper adds to the research on the effect of state versus private ownership on 
capital structure.
2
 In particular, we examine the impact of the largest shareholding, 
state ownership and institutions on the financial decision of both SOEs and non-
SOEs. Second, our paper presents fresh evidence on how largest shareholding and 
institutional development affects firm’s leverage decisions, Li et al. (2009) 
investigated the effect of ownership structure and institutions on leverage, but in their 
paper, they ignores the impact of largest shareholding, and also they use survey data 
of non-listed firms. So our paper is the first paper to investigate the effect of largest 
shreholding on leverage of SOEs and Non-SOEs. Third, this is the first paper that 
examines the influence of the share split reform on firm’s capital structure decision, 
by comparing the capital structure decisions of both SOEs and Non-SOEs before and 
after the share split reform.  Finally, this paper examines the effect of minority state 
shareholding on the capital structure decisions in non-SOEs, and compares it to the 
effect of the largest state shareholding in state-controlled firms. 
Our findings indicate that Chinese SOEs have higher leverage ratios than non-
SOEs. SOEs in regions with a poorer institutional environment have higher leverage 
ratios than SOEs in better regions. While government intervention may have 
ownership discrimination against non-SOEs, this study shows that the political 
connections that come through minority state ownership help non-SOEs to access 
external bank loans. We also show that the largest shareholding (measured as the 
proportion of shares held by the large shareholder) in SOEs has a negative 
relationship with leverage ratio, while the largest shareholding in non-SOEs has a 
non-linear relationship with short-term and long-term debt ratio. We also found that 
share split reform not only reduced the ownership concentration and increased the 
leverage ratio of both SOEs and Non-SOEs. Share split reform and improvements of 
institutional environment also weaken the negative relationship and strengthen the 
positive relationship between largest shareholding and leverage of SOEs and Non-
SOEs to some extent. We document that the financing behaviour of SOEs is more 
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influenced by governmental intervention, while the financing behaviour of Non-SOEs 
is more market oriented.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a 
literature review and develops several testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes how 
the variables are measured and what methodology we chose. Section 4 presents our 
main empirical results and offers some interpretations. Last, Section 5 summarizes 
the main conclusions of the research. 
 
Literature review and hypotheses 
After the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), two main capital structure 
theories have emerged during the past 40 years, including the trade-off theory 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Miller, 1977) and the 
pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984). The trade-off theory states that a 
value-maximizing firm will pursue an optimal capital structure by considering the 
marginal costs and benefits of each additional unit of financing. As an alternative to 
the trade-off model, the pecking order hypothesis of corporate leverage is based on 
asymmetric information problems. It predicts that firms will prefer internal financing 
to issuing security, and if forced to resort to external financing, will use debt before 
equity. 
The more recent body of literature indicates that the firm-specific and country-
specific factors in firms’ leverage choices differ across countries (for example, Jong 
et al., 2007; Akhtar and Oliver, 2009; Delcoure, 2007), and particularly focuses on 
the effect of state ownership and regional institutions on firms’ capital structure 
decisions, and more especially on the role of Chinese state ownership. Brandt and Li 
(2003) and Cull et al. (2009) found evidence suggesting that private firms in China 
are denied access to bank loans and that they resort to more expensive trade credits 
instead. Li et al. (2009) found that state ownership was positively associated with 
firms’ leverage decision and use of long-term debt, and that firms in better developed 
regions are associated with reduced access to long-term debt. Firth et al. (2009) found 
that having the state as a minority owner helps private firms to obtain external bank 
loans, especially for large firms and firms located in regions with a less well-
developed banking sector. Overall, this body of literature argues that SOEs have a 
higher leverage than non-SOEs, and that this represents so-called ownership 
discrimination. In addition, we also find a Chinese publication paper arguing that that 
listed SOEs in China have a lower leverage ratio than Non-SOEs (Xiao, 2009). 
Based on the current literature reviewed in this section, we applied these theories 




The role of state ownership is still a controversial topic in Chinese economic 
structural reform. Chinese SOEs may be more likely to have a higher debt ratio than 
other firms for two reasons. First, the role of the Chinese government in corporate 
financing decisions is pivotal, given its dual roles as a large shareholder of SOEs, as 
well as the owner of all major banks (Li et al., 2009). Therefore, the Chinese 
government tends to put pressure on the banking system to lend primarily to SOEs, 
and stipulates preference loan rates (from which banks rarely deviate) with little 
regard for financial considerations (Gordon and Li, 2003; Allen et al., 2005; García-
Herrero et al., 2005). Second, SOEs and State-owned commerial banks (SOCBs) 
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have similar organisational structures and administrative styles, inherited from a time 
before the reforms that accompanied the “open-door policy”. This shared interest has 
created an environment where lending by SOCBs is still partially determined by 
political reasons, rather than commercial motives (Park and Sehrt, 2001). In this 
environment, non-SOEs in China will always face “ownership discrimination” when 
they apply for bank loans. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis to examine the 
effect of state ownership on the capital structure of Chinese firms: 
 
H1a: A positive relationship exists between state ownership and the leverage decision of a 
firm, so SOEs in China have higher leverage ratios than non-SOEs. 
 
Evidence also exists indicating that the political connections between non-SOEs 
and banks are also helpful for securing loans. For example, Firth et al. (2009) suggest 
that private, unlisted firms that have a state minority shareholder have access to more 
bank loans. This paper further argues that such political connections are also 
important for Chinese listed non-SOEs. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H1b: Non-SOEs with a state minority shareholder carry more debt, especially in the form 
of more bank loans, compared to other non-SOEs. 
 
Huge development gaps are evident in different regions in China, so this 
research also seeks to determine whether the capital structures of Chinese SOE and 
non-SOEs are influenced by a regional effect.
3
 Research on Chinese non-listed firms 
indicates that firms in better developed regions are associated with reduced access to 
long-term debt (Li et al. 2009). While another study on Chinese listed manufacture 
firms found no important differences in financing across regions (Kasseeah, 2008). 
However, no extant literature investigates the regional development effect on capital 
structure between SOEs and non-SOEs in China. 
The Chinese government tends to pressure the banking system to lend primarily 
to SOEs, and more government interventions occur in poorly developed regions 
compared to well-developed regions (Fan et al. 2007). Therefore, we argue that SOEs 
in poorly developed regions should have more debt. Compared with SOEs, the 
financing behaviour of non-SOEs in China is more market oriented. This makes it 
easier for non-SOEs in better developed regions to raise both equity and debt 
financing, which leads to a statistically insignificant relationship between regional 
development and the leverage capability of non-SOEs. Thus, we propose the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H1c: Regional institutional development has a negative relationship with the leverage 
decision of SOEs. 





Considering the effect of the largest shareholding on firm leverage, the extant 
literature contains two contrary hypotheses: the incentive hypothesis and the 
expropriation hypothesis. First, the incentive hypothesis holds that a positive 
relationship exists between the largest shareholding and leverage capability. This 
hypothesis argues that the predominant agency problem arises between shareholders 
and managers, due to the separation between ownership and control. Therefore, 
ownership concentration in the hands of a few large shareholders could reduce the 
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agency cost between shareholders and managers (the so-called first type agency 
problem), due to “the active monitoring hypothesis” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
According to the active monitoring hypothesis, the largest shareholder has an 
incentive to monitor and influence managers to protect their investments (Friend and 
Lang, 1988). In contrast, the expropriation hypothesis suggests that when large 
shareholders effectively control a corporation, agency problems arise mainly between 
large controlling shareholders and external minority shareholders (the so-called 
second type agency problem). The largest shareholder will pursue their own private 
benefits in the expropriation of minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La 
Porta et al., 1998). These private benefits of control have been widely documented, 
and may be substantial, especially in countries with less-effective minority investor 
protection such as China (Nenova, 2000; Dyck and Zingales, 2002). Therefore, under 
the second hypothesis, the largest shareholders may prefer equity financing to obtain 
private benefits from minority shareholders. 
So far, no extant literature investigates the relationship between largest 
shareholding and leverage of Chinese firms, especially the different effect of largest 
shareholding on leverage of Chinese SOEs and Non-SOEs. We expect that the largest 
shareholding will influence capital structure decisions differently in SOEs and non-
SOEs. The most serious agency problems of Chinese SOEs lie with the application of 
principals (Zhang, 1998): Chinese SOEs have a specific corporate governance model 
with a multilayered principal–agent framework and ambiguous clarification of 
ultimate property rights. This can be characterized as an “agent monitoring agent” 
situation, and under this framework, the principal is the state, where all the central 
government, provincial governments, local officials and so on, serve as agents of the 
state. These agents also hold the control rights in the name of the state — but they are 
not the residual claimants. Thus, no one in the chain of the principal–agent 
relationships has the incentive to pursue profit maximization for the real principal 
(Shi, 2009). Consequently, the largest shareholder of the SOEs has little incentive to 
monitor managers. On the other hand, the expropriation effect is more severe in 
China than in Western countries, due to the highly concentrated ownership structure 
and lack of protection of the interest of minority shareholders. Therefore, Chinese 
listed firms — especially Chinese SOEs — have built-in incentives for raising equity 
(Zou et al., 2006). Thus, we expect to find a negative relationship between the 
leverage capability of a firm and the largest shareholding of an SOE, and propose the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H2a: A negative relationship exists between the largest shareholding and the leverage 
decision of a Chinese SOE firm. 
 
Different from the SOEs, non-SOEs are ultimately controlled by the private 
sector, so largest shareholder of the non-SOEs may have more incentive to monitor 
the entrenchment of managers. Therefore, we believe that although the largest 
shareholders of non-SOEs may also prefer equity financing due to the expropriation 
effect, at least to some extent, they will also have incentives to use more debt when 
they hold more shares, and thus we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H2b: The largest shareholding has a non-linear relationship with the leverage decision of 
non-SOEs. 
 
Recent literature also suggests that the concentration of shares held by other top 
shareholders (apart from the controlling shareholder) could reduce the opportunistic 
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behaviour of controlling shareholders. Pagano and Roell (1999) and La Potra et al. 
(1999) found that the existence of several large shareholders can either supervise the 
managers effectively, or internalize the private benefits of control rights and reduce 
the “tunnel” action of the largest shareholder. We used the percentage of 
shareholding of the top two to five shareholders as a monitoring power for 
constraining the behaviour of the largest shareholders in this research, and propose 
the following hypothesis: 
 
H2c: A positive relationship exists between the proportion of shares held by the top two to 
five shareholders (apart from the controlling shareholder) and the firm’s leverage. 
 
Recent literature also shows that the effect of the largest shareholder on capital 
structure may also be influenced by regional institutional environment. For example, 
Dyck and Zingales (2002) argue that better protection of invertors could lead to a 
decrease in the private interest of largest shareholders. So we argue that a better 
institutional environment can produce better protection of the interest of small 
shareholders and an improved corporate governance mechanism, and thus reduce the 
opportunistic behaviour of the largest shareholders. Consequently, the improvement 
of institutional environments can either weaken the negative relationship between the 
largest shareholding of both SOEs and non-SOEs and firms’ leverage, or strengthen 
the positive relationship between the largest shareholding and the leverage capability 
of non-SOEs. Thus we propose two further hypotheses: 
 
H2d: the improvement of legal and institutional environments can either weaken a negative 
relationship between largest shareholding and leverage of both SOEs and Non-SOEs, or 
strengthen a positive relationship between largest shareholding and the leverage of Non-
SOEs.   
 
As discussed above, prior to the share split reform, which was implemented 
during 2005 and 2006, shares of Chinese listed firms were divided into non-tradable 
and tradable shares. The former is mainly held by central and local government 
through their bureaucratic agencies (SOEs) or legal-persons (Non-SOEs), while the 
latter can be held by any of the above or private entities. This is known as split share 
structure.  The split share structure has often been blamed for leading to severe ageny 
problems between largest non-tradable shareholders and minority tradable 
shareholders (Yeh, et al. 2009) and reducing firms’ corporate governance quality and 
performance efficiency (Sun and Tong, 2003). For example, Firth et al. (2006) argue 
that holding restricted shares gives less incentive for the controlling state 
shareholders to monitor executives to ensure that they maximize stock value. 
Following the reform, not only the agency conflict between controlling shareholders 
and minority shareholders was reduced, but also the controlling shareholders have a 
great incentive to monitor behavior of managers, and to ensure that they maximize 
shareholders’ wealth. Therefore, we expect that the share split reform can strengthen 
the positive relationship or weaken the negative relationship between largest 
shareholding and leverage of both SOEs and Non-SOEs, and we propose the 
following hypotheses: 
 
H2e: the share split reform can either weaken a negative relationship between largest 
shareholding and leverage of both SOEs and Non-SOEs, or strengthen a positive 
relationship between largest shareholding and the leverage of Non-SOEs.  
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Methodology and measurement of variables 
 
Data collection 
All the financial data used in this study were gathered from the China Stock Market 
and Accounting Research Database (CSMAR) that was developed by the Shenzhen 
GTA Information Technology Company and the University of Hong Kong, and the 
China Centre for Economic Research Database (CCER) that was developed by 
SinoFin Information Technology Company and Peking (Beijing) University. As 
indicated by previous studies, both the CCER and CSMAR are the most important 
databases on the Chinese capital market (Kato and Long, 2005; Firth et al., 2006, 
2007). 
We excluded: 1) financial firms,
4
 2) ST or PT firms, 3) negative-equity firms 
and 4) firms whose relevant data were incomplete or could not be acquired. This 
paper defines SOEs as firms whose ultimate owner are central or local governments, 
and non-SOEs as firms whose ultimate owner are individuals or non-governmental 
organizations. According to the instruction of China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC), the “ultimate owner” of a publicly listed company as: (1) the 
largest shareholder; or (2) the shareholder with a greater voting power than the largest 
shareholder; or (3) the shareholder with shareholding or voting rights above 30% of 
the total shares or voting rights in the company; or (4) the shareholder who can 
determine over half of the board members. A final number of 8,376 firm-year 
observations from the Chinese capital market were available for analysis during the 
period 2002–2009, of which 5,854 were SOEs (755 firms) and 2,522 were non-SOEs 
(356 firms). 
 
 Measuring variables 
 
This study used four different measures of capital structure for the dependent 
variables: total debt ratio (TDR), short-term debt ratio (STDR), long-term debt ratio 
(LTDR) and bank ratio (BR). More specifically, the calculation of the four dependent 
variables is: 
LEV = total debt to total assets 
STDR = total short-term debt to total assets 
LTDR = total long-term debt to total assets 
BR = total bank financing to total assets. 
The definitions and calculations of the independent variables are: 
state ownership (STATE) = defined as a dummy variable — we ascribed a 
value of 1 to state-owned firms and a value of 0 to non-state owned firms. 
largest shareholding (LARGEST) = shares controlled by the largest shareholder 
compared to total shares. 
(LAREGST
2
) = squared largest shareholding, this variable is used to examine 
the non-linear relationship between largest shareholding and the dependent 
variables. If the regression coefficients of LARGEST and LARGEST
2
 are both 
statistically significant, but have different sign, we can conclude that there is a 
non-linear relationship, either U-shaped or reverse U-shaped relationship, 
between largest shareholding and capital structure. 
top two to five large shareholders (TOP) = shares held by the top two to five 
shareholders compared to total shares. 
institutional environment index (INDEX) = we adopted the marketization index 
for China’s provinces, compiled by Fan et al. (2009). (See Appendix A for 
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detailed description for the index, and see Appendix B for descriptive statistics 
for the index for each province in China). As the data in Fan et al. (2009) only 
covers the period from 1997 to 2007, following Li et al. (2009), we use the 
values of 2002 to 2006 indices for our firms in years 2002 to 2006, and use the 
value of 2007 indices for our firms in years 2007 to 2009. 
state minority (STATEMI) = defined as a dummy variable — we ascribed a 
value of 1 to non-SOEs that have state shareholders as a minority shareholder, 
and a value of 0 to non-SOEs that have no state shareholders as a minority 
shareholder. 
The control variables used in this research are: 
asset structure (ASSET) = total fixed assets to total assets. 
effective tax rate (TAX) = total tax paid by the firm to total assets. 
size (SIZE) = log 10 of total assets. 
profitability (ROA) = ratio of pre-tax profits to total assets. 
In addition, year dummies and industry dummies are also included in our 




Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the main dependent and independent 
variables for our sample firms. This Table shows that Chinese SOEs had an average 
debt ratio of 50.8 percent, which is significantly higher than that of Non-SOEs (41.4 
percent). Therefore, hypothesis H1a is supported by the result of the univariate test 
here. With respect to debt maturity, the mean for the short-term debt ratio of SOEs 
was 41.84 percent (non-SOEs: 36.37 percent), and the mean for the long-term debt 
ratio of SOEs was just 8.91 percent (non-SOEs: 5.07 percent). This indicates that 
Chinese SOEs also have both higher short-term and long-term debt ratios than non-
SOEs. In addition, the average bank debt ratio of SOEs was about 23.33 percent of 
total assets (non-SOEs: 18.72 percent). Chinese SOEs have more bank loans than 
non-SOEs, indicating that SOEs have an advantage in acquiring external bank loans. 
Overall, compared to SOEs, Chinese non-SOEs have lower leverage ratios and a 
lower bank loan ratio. 
Table 1 also shows that the average largest shareholding of SOEs was quite high, 
at 41.50 percent (non-SOEs: 34.84 percent). These results indicate that Chinese listed 
companies have a much more concentrated ownership structure, within which, the 
ownership structure of SOEs is even more concentrated than non-SOEs. Compared to 
the high proportion of shares controlled by the largest shareholders, shares held by 
the top two to five shareholders were relatively small (just 13.62 per cent for SOEs 
and 18.10 per cent for non-SOEs), indicating that if the top two to five shareholders 
are considered a monitoring power for constraining the behaviour of the largest 
shareholders, such monitoring power for listed firms in China (especially for SOEs) 
may be ineffective. In addition, Table 1 also shows us that the average institutional 
environment index for Non-SOEs is higher than SOEs, indicating that more Non-
SOEs located in well developed regions than their counterparts. 
 




Mean Median Maximum Minium T-Stat 
LEV 
SOEs 755 0.508  0.521  0.997  0.002  
22.697**** 
non-SOEs 356 0.414  0.417  0.994  0.023  
The Effect of Ownership Structure on Leverage Decision, page 10 of 24 
STDR 
SOEs 755 0.418  0.418  0.994  0.002  
13.809***  
non-SOEs 356 0.364  0.359  0.944  0.009  
LTDR 
SOEs 755 0.089  0.047  0.719  0.000  
16.126***  
non-SOEs 356 0.0510  0.018  0.447  0.000  
BR 
SOEs 755 0.233  0.230  0.805  0.000  
13.524***  
non-SOEs 356 0.187  0.181  0.616  0.000  
LARGEST 
SOEs 755 0.415  0.408  0.850  0.017  
17.487***  
non-SOEs 356 0.348  0.314  0.852  0.032  
TOP 
SOEs 755 0.136  0.099  0.582  0.002  
-14.393***  
non-SOEs 356 0.181  0.167  0.562  0.002  
ASSET 
SOEs 755 0.366  0.345  0.985  0.000  
11.235***  
non-SOEs 356 0.312  0.292  0.972  0.000  
INDEX 
SOEs 755 8.045  8.940  11.710 0.630  
-10.533***  
non-SOEs 356 8.932  9.360  11.710  0.630  
TAX 
SOEs 755 0.012  0.007  0.321  -0.074  
0.3682  
non-SOEs 356 0.011  0.008  0.122  -0.050  
SIZE 
SOEs 755 6.155  2.279  866.475  0.141  
22.690***  
non-SOEs 356 2.427 1.331  137.609  0.140  
ROA 
SOEs 755 0.039  0.037  0.906  -3.036  
-3.753***  
non-SOEs 356 0.047  0.046  0.442  -2.743  
Notes: LEV is measured as the ratio of total liabilities over total assets. 
STDR is the ratio of short-term liabilities over total assets. 
LTDR is the ratio of long-term liabilities over total assets. 
BR is the total bank loans over total assets. 
LARGEST is the proportion of shares held by the largest shareholder. 
TOP is the proportion of shares held by the top two to five shareholders. 
ASSET is total tangible assets over total assets. 
INDEX is the legal and institutional environment index established by Fan (2007). 
TAX is the total tax paid by the firm to total assets. 
SIZE is the firm’s total assets in billions of RMB yuan. 
ROA is ratio of pre-tax profits to total assets. 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level of significance. 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level of significance; 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. 
 




According to the hypotheses and variables described in the previous section, we 
estimate the following reduced form of our basic models for regressions: 
2
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 ,
4 , 5 , 6 , ,
i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
Y STATE LARGEST LARGEST
TOP INDEX CONTROLS
β β β β
β β β ε
= + + + +
+ + +
         Equation (1) 
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  Equation (3) 
Equation (1) is the regression of the full sample. Equation (2) is the regression of 
SOEs. Equation (3) is the regression of the non-SOEs. For firm i in year t, the capital 
structure measures are: leverage ratio (LEV), short-term debt ratio (STDR), long-term 
debt ratio (LTDR) and bank ratio (BR). Our basic empirical models are panel data 
regressions. We expected that firms within a province would be more likely to have 
similar characteristics, and thus be more likely to be correlated with one another. This 




4.2 Full sample results 
 
Table 2 presents the regression results using the full sample and model specification,
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as given in Equation 1. As shown in Table 2, state ownership is statistically 
significantly and positively associated with the firm’s leverage ratio and bank ratio, 
which is consistent with both hypothesis H1a and the findings in the research of 
Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) and Li et al. (2009), which also show that SOEs tend 
to have higher leverage ratios. This result also indicates that the dual roles of the 
Chinese government as the owner of SOEs and of the four largest domestic banks 
results in investments of SOEs being supported by the government through heavily 
subsidised bank loans, leading to excessive leverage in SOEs (Li et al. 2009). 
Our results indicate that the largest shareholding has a statistically significantly 
negative relationship with firm leverage ratios and long-term debt ratio of Chinese 
firms. The negative relationship between the largest shareholding and leverage ratio 
indicates that the agency conflict between large controlling shareholders and external 
minority shareholders in China is severe, because China is still a transition economy 
and investor protection by the legal system is imperfect. 
Inconsistent with hypothesis H2c, our regressions indicate that the top two to 
five shareholders do not adequately monitor the opportunistic behaviour of the largest 
shareholders, becuase the coefficients of the variable TOP are all statistically 
significantly (negative). We argue that this may be because the concentration of 
shares held by the top two to five shareholders are relatively low, so they may have 
no voice in the firm’s capital structure decisions. On the other hand, the largest 
shareholders can easily buy off some of the top two to five shareholders, because they 
hold a relatively small proportion of outstanding shares. 
Our results also show that the regional institutional environment index has a 
statistically significantly negative relationship with leverage ratio and long-term debt 
ratio of Chinese listed firms. We argue that this is because local governments tend to 
intervene more often in firms in regions with a low institutional market index (Fan et 
al., 2007). The influence of government intervention on firm’s leverage decision is as 
follows: first, the government intervention can reduce the possibility of companies’ 
default through financial subsidy, so it will be easier for companies to obtain long-
term borrowings; second, it helps firms to get loans by exerting effect on bank’s 
lending decisions, and most of the loans are long-term loans so as to weaken the 
The Effect of Ownership Structure on Leverage Decision, page 12 of 24 
influence of officials’ replacement on borrowing cost (Fan et al., 2003). Third, it 
facilitates issuance of long-term debt through maintaining predictable value of 
currency (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999).  Consequently, firms in regions 
with a lower market index may be more influenced by government intervention, and 
have more long-term debt and more bank loans. 
 
Table 2 Regression coefficients of full sample firms 
Var LEV STDR LTDR BR 
C -0.751  -0.084  -0.666  -0.399  
 0.000  0.027  0.000  0.000  
STATE 0.065 *** 0.051 *** 0.014***   0.023 *** 
 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
LARGEST -0.016 * 0.085 * -0.069 ** 0.026  
 0.058  0.092  0.016  0.545  
LARGEST2 -0.205***  -0.255 *** 0.051  -0.229 *** 
 0.001  0.000  0.142  0.000  
TOP -0.054*** -0.093***   0.037***   -0.103***   
 0.001  0.000  0.001  0.000  
INDEX -0.003 *** -0.001  -0.003 *** -0.001  
 0.000  0.602  0.000  0.126  
ASSET -0.072***  -0.216 *** 0.143 *** 0.159 *** 
 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
TAX 0.132 *** 0.046 *** 0.084 *** 0.060 *** 
 0.000  0.002  0.000  0.000  
SIZE 0.139 *** 0.062 *** 0.077 *** 0.067 *** 
 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
ROA -0.627 *** -0.528 *** -0.098 *** -0.433 *** 
 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
R2 0.254  0.184  0.252  0.183  
F-Stat 177.753  117.588  176.027  116.797  
Notes: LEV is measured as the ratio of total liabilities over total assets. 
STDR is the ratio of short-term liabilities over total assets. 
LTDR is the ratio of long-term debt over total assets. 
BR is the ratio of total bank loans over total assets. 
The STATE dummy is set to equate to 1 if the firm is an SOE, and 0 otherwise. 
LARGEST is the proportion of shares held by the largest shareholder. 
LARGEST
2
 is the square of the proportion of shares held by the largest shareholder. 
TOP is the proportion of shares held by the top two to five shareholders. 
INDEX is the legal and institutional environment index established by Fan (2007). 
ASSET is the ratio of total fixed assets to total assets. 
TAX is the total tax paid by the firm to total assets. 
SIZE is the 10 logarithm of total assets. 
ROA is ratio of pre-tax profits to total assets. 
Year dummies and industry dummies are included in each regression, but not 
reported. 
P-values are displayed in italics. 
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Regression results for SOEs and non-SOEs 
 
In order to compare the determinants of capital structure between SOEs and non-
SOEs, we conducted a further comparable analysis on SOEs and non-SOEs 
separately, using Equation 2 and Equation 3. The regression results are reported 
below in Table 3, where SOEs columns present the regression results of SOEs, using 
LEV, STDR, LTDR and BR as dependent variables, and non-SOEs columns present 
the regression results of non-SOEs, using LEV, STDR, LTDR and BR as dependent 
variables. 
Table 3 shows some interesting results. First, we find that the varibale 
STATEMI have a statistically positive relationship with the four dependent variables 
of the Non-SOEs. Suggesting that Non-SOEs with state as a minority shareholder 
appear to have more access to bank loans, so political connections are important for 
Non-SOEs, thus hypothesis H1b is also supported. Our result is also consistent with 
the finding of Firth et al. (2009). Our results also indicate that the institutional 
environment index has a statistically significantly negative relationship with the 
leverage ratio and long-term debt ratio of SOEs, which is consistent with hypothesis 
H1c. However, institutional environment has no statistically significant relationship 
with leverage ratios of Non-SOEs; thus hypothesis H1d is also proved here. We argue 
that the negative relationship between institutional environment index and leverage of 
SOEs is because financing behavior of SOEs in China is greatly influenced by 
government intervention, and the governmental intervention is more severe in poorly 
developed regions than in well developed regions (Fan et al. 2007).  
As expected, our regression results show that the largest shareholding has a 
statistically significantly negative relationship with leverage ratio and short-term debt 
ratio of SOEs, which is consistent with hypothesis H2a. In contrast, the largest 
shareholding has a reverse U-shaped relationship with short-term debt ratio and a U-
shaped relationship with long-term debt ratio of Non-SOEs, so hypothesis H2b is also 
supported here. These results occur because controlling shareholder of Non-SOEs has 
more incentive to monitor the opportunistic behavior or managers than their 
counterparts in SOEs. 
 
Table 3 Regression coefficients of SOEs and non-SOEs 
Var LEV STDR LTDR BR 
 SOEs non-SOEs SOEs non-SOEs SOEs non-SOEs SOEs non-SOEs 
C -0.582  -0.993  0.119  -0.512  -0.701  0.483  0.345  -0.473  
 0.000  0.000  0.008  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
LARGEST -0.068 * 0.065  -0.024***  0.237 *** -0.046  -0.171 *** 0.035  -0.076  
 0.069  0.475  0.007  0.007  0.228  0.000  0.510  0.292  
LARGEST2 -0.127 * -0.130  -0.132 * -0.350*** 0.006  0.218 *** -0.250 *** -0.023  
 0.074  0.267  0.064  0.002  0.897  0.000  0.000  0.810  
TOP -0.038 * -0.035  -0.065***  -0.089 *** 0.024 * 0.055***  -0.089 *** -0.097 *** 
 0.063  0.230  0.002  0.001  0.050  0.000  0.000  0.000  
INDEX -0.0039 *** -0.0007  -0.0012  0.0011  -0.0029 *** -0.0018  -0.0010  -0.0006  
 0.000  0.672  0.293  0.489  0.000  0.162  0.316  0.669  
ASSET -0.068 *** -0.065 *** -0.233  *** -0.137  *** 0.164  *** 0.072  *** 0.171 ***  0.132 ***  
 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
TAX 0.127 *** -0.691 ** 0.038 ** -0.554 ** 0.088 *** -0.135  0.062 *** -1.771 *** 
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Var LEV STDR LTDR BR 
 SOEs non-SOEs SOEs non-SOEs SOEs non-SOEs SOEs non-SOEs 
 0.000  0.011  0.013  0.035  0.000  0.276  0.000  0.000  
SIZE 0.131 *** 0.158 *** 0.049 *** 0.098***  0.082 *** 0.059 *** 0.063 *** 0.075***  
 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
ROA -0.713 *** -0.415 *** -0.595 *** -0.353 *** -0.117 *** -0.063 *** -0.523 *** -0.165 *** 
 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.003  0.000  0.000  
STATEMI  0.060 ***  0.044 ***  0.016 ***  0.027 *** 
  0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000  
R2 0.224  0.226  0.191  0.155  0.256  0.162  0.181  0.178  
F-stat 112.610  45.673  91.972  28.791  133.705  30.206  86.309  33.973  
Notes: LEV, STDR, LTDR, BR, LARGEST, LARGEST
2
, TOP, INDEX, ASSET, 
TAX, SIZE and ROA have the same meaning as indicated in the notes to Table 2. 
The dummy variable STATEMI is set to equate to 1 if the non-SOEs have state 
shareholders as minority shareholders and 0 otherwise. 
The year dummies and industry dummies are included in each regression, but not 
reported. 
SOEs columns present the regression results of SOEs, using LEV, STDR, LTDR and 
BR as dependent variables. 
Non-SOEs columns present the regression results of non-SOEs, using LEV, STDR, 
LTDR and BR as dependent variables. 
Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below coefficients; p-values are 
displayed in italics. 
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
The Interaction Results of Institutional and the Largest 
Shareholder for Both SOEs and non-SOEs 
 
As discussed above, we expect that the negative (positive) effect of largest 
shareholding on capital structure should be weakened (strengthen) in areas with a 
better institutional environment. In standard setups, the above relation can be 
explored by adding interaction terms between ownership variables and the level of 
institutional development to our Eq (2) and Eq (3). Since our measures of institutional 
development slowly change over time and also vary only at the regional level, the 
interaction terms between largest shareholding variable and the level of institutional 
development are highly correlated with the largest shareholding. We opt to employ 
sub-samples to investigate the interaction effects.  
The regional division criterion widely used to measure institutional development 
variation in China is the division between eastern (coastal), central and western 
regions.
7
 The eastern region (the coastal provinces), is considered to have the better 
developed credit market and legal system, due to its advantageous geographical 
positioning and well-developed market economy. Based on this regional division 
criterion, we further separate the full sample into four subsamples: 1) SOEs in well-
developed regions, 2) SOEs in poorly developed regions, 3) non-SOEs in well-
developed and 4) non-SOEs in poorly developed regions. We then conducted further 
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regressions using the four subsamples to test the interaction effects. The results are 
reported in Table 4, in which panel A presents the regression results of SOEs in well-
developed and poorly developed regions, and panel B presents the regression results 
of non-SOEs in well-developed and poorly developed regions. 
As shown in Table 4, panel A, largest shareholding has a statistically negative 
relationship with leverage ratio and short-term debt ratio of SOEs in poorly 
developed regions, and in well developed regions, such negative relationships 
become insignificant. This result indicate that the improvement of institutional 
development weakens the negative relationship between largest shareholding and 
leverage ratio of SOEs, which is consistent with H2d, Interestingly, we find that 
largest shareholder have an U-shaped relationship with long-term debt ratio of SOEs 
in well developed regions, and a reverse U-shaped relationship with long-term debt 
ratio of SOEs in poorly developed regions. Indicating that controlling shareholder of 
SOEs tend to choose more long-term debt in well developed regions than in poorly 
developed regions when they hold more shares. 
Panel B in Table 4 shows that in well developed regions, largest shareholding 
has a reverse U-shaped relationship with short-term debt ratio, and a U-shaped 
relationship with long-term debt ratio. But in poorly developed regions, no significant 
relationship between largest shareholder and firm leverage ratios was found. Since 
the positive relationship is strengthened in well developed regions, our hypothesis 
H2d is also supported. In addition, Table 4, panel B also shows that the positive 
relationship between state minority shareholding and leverage ratios of Non-SOEs 
was found in both well developed and poorly developed regions, indicating that 
political connection is important for Non-SOEs to get bank loans. 
 
Table 4 Regression results of SOEs and non-SOEs in well-developed and poorly- 
developed regions 
Panel A: Regression results of SOEs in well-developed and poorly-developed regions 
Var LEV STDR LTDR BR 
 Well Poorly Well Poorly Well Poorly Well Poorly 
C -0.431  -0.880  0.136  0.096  -0.567  -0.978  -0.235  -0.535  
 0.000  0.000  0.019  0.179  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
LARGEST -0.075  -0.026 * 0.056  -0.143 * -0.134 *** 0.118* 0.027  0.061  
 0.339  0.078* 0.480  0.083  0.004  0.054* 0.690  0.453  
LARGEST2 -0.064  -0.182  -0.209 ** 0.049  0.147 *** -0.234 *** -0.193**  -0.297 *** 
 0.474  0.100  0.022  0.664  0.007  0.001  0.015 0.002  
TOP -0.057 ** 0.041  -0.083 *** 0.001  0.023  0.039*  -0.087 *** -0.064 ** 
 0.030  0.186  0.002  0.988  0.135  0.056  0.000  0.019  
ASSET -0.125 *** 0.073 *** -0.263 *** -0.154 *** 0.136***  0.227 *** 0.131 *** 0.259***  
 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000  
TAX 0.124 *** -1.942***  0.044***  -1.466***  0.079***  -0.482***  0.062***  -2.224***  
 0.000  0.000  0.005  0.000  0.000  0.003  0.000  0.000  
SIZE 0.114 *** 0.152***  0.047***  0.048***  0.067***  0.105***  0.051***  0.079***  
 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
ROA -1.007 *** -0.385***  -0.845***  -0.330***  -0.160***  -0.054**  -0.699***  -0.257***  
 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.021  0.000  0.000  
R2 0.244  0.289  0.240  0.150  0.219  0.333  0.160  0.282  
F-Stat 80.097 68.544 78.271 29.764 69.687 84.417 47.181 66.164 
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Panel B: Regression results of non-SOEs in well-developed and poorly-developed regions  
Var LEV STDR LTDR BR 
 Well Poorly Well Poorly Well Poorly Well Poorly 
C -1.109  -0.731  -0.615  -0.281  -0.495  -0.449  -0.450  -0.631  
 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.084  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
LARGEST 0.028  0.108  0.331***  -0.040  -0.302***  0.151**  -0.128  0.105  
 0.797  0.515  0.001  0.796  0.000  0.035  0.146  0.420  
LARGEST2 -0.038  -0.254  -0.399***  -0.149  0.359***  -0.107  0.008  -0.164  
 0.788  0.214  0.004  0.444  0.000  0.225  0.941  0.308  
TOP -0.013  -0.065  -0.066 ** -0.133 ** 0.052 *** 0.068***  -0.108***  -0.044  
 0.681  0.276  0.038  0.019  0.001  0.008  0.001  0.345  
ASSET -0.113 *** 0.082**  -0.188***  0.001  0.071***  0.082***  0.127***  0.150***  
 0.000  0.026  0.000  0.988  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
TAX -0.854 *** -0.396  -0.905***  0.128  0.052  -0.522**  -1.737***  -1.755***  
 0.009  0.418  0.004  0.782  0.731  0.013  0.000  0.000  
SIZE 0.171 *** 0.125***  0.109***  0.078***  0.062***  0.046***  0.074***  0.087***  
 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
ROA -0.374 *** -0.506***  -0.300***  -0.468***  -0.074***  -0.038  -0.128***  -0.265***  
 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.224  0.000  0.000  
STATEMI 0.067 *** 0.041***  0.053***  0.021*  0.014***  0.019***  0.024***  0.032***  
 0.000  0.001  0.000  0.072  0.000  0.000  0.002  0.000  
R2 0.272  0.168  0.197  0.120  0.192  0.137  0.184  0.179  
F-Stat 42.420  10.664  27.900  7.217  27.006  8.366  25.719  11.436  
Notes: LEV, STDR, LTDR, BR, LARGEST, LARGEST
2
, TOP, ASSET, TAX, 
SIZE, ROA and STATEMI have the same meaning as described in the notes to Table 
2 and Table 3. 
The year dummies and industry dummies are included in each regression, but not 
reported. 
Well columns present the regression results in well-developed regions, using LEV, 
STDR, LTDR and BR as dependent variables. 
Poorly columns present the regression results in poorly developed regions, using 
LEV, STDR, LTDR and BR as dependent variables. 
Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below coefficients; p-values are 
displayed in italics. 
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
The effect of share split reform on capital structure of both SOEs 
and non-SOEs 
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In order to examine the effect of share split reform on firm’s capital structure 
decision, we further compares the capital structure of SOEs and Non-SOEs before 
and after the share split reform. The results are reported in Table 5, in which panel A 
presents the summary statistics of SOEs and non-SOEs before and after the share 
split reform, panel B presents the regression results of SOEs before and after the 
share split reform, while panel C presents the regression results of non-SOEs. 
Panel A in Table 5 shows that both SOEs and Non-SOEs employ more leverage, 
short-term debt and long-term debt after the share split reform than before. Whereas 
both SOEs and Non-SOEs employ similar levels of bank loans before and after the 
share split reform. The result also indicates that both largest shareholding and the 
shares held by top two to five shareholders are significantly lower after the share split 
reform than before, suggesting that the share split reform reduces the ownership 
concentration of Chinese firms. 
As shown in panel B Table 5, largest shareholding has a negative relationship 
with leverage ratio, short-term debt ratio and bank ratio of SOEs before the share split 
reform, while after the reform, largest shareholding appears to have a reverse U-
shaped relationship with leverage and bank ratio of SOEs, which is consistent with 
our hypothesis H2e. These results indicate that after the reform, largest shreholder of 
SOEs have more incentive to moniter the opportunistic behavior of managers and less 
incentive to pursue their private benefit against the minority shareholders, because the 
reform reduces the agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders and improves the corporate governance quality of SOEs. 
Panel C in Table 5 shows that no non-linear relationship was found between 
largest shareholding and the dependent variables before the share split reform, but 
largest shareholding have non-linear relationship with short-term debt ratio and long-
term debt ratio of Non-SOEs after the share split reform. In addition, the statistically 
significantly nagative relationship between largest shareholding and bank ratio 
becomes insignificant after the share split reform. These results also indicate that the 
share split reform strengthens the positive relationship, and weakens the negaitive 
relationship between largest shareholding and leverage of Non-SOEs, which is also 
consistent with H2e. 
 
Table 5 Regression results of SOEs and non-SOEs before and after the share split 
reform 
Panel A Summary statistics of SOEs and Non-SOEs before and after the share split reform 
      SOEs     Non-SOEs 
   Before After   Before After 
Capital structures        
LEV Mean  0.479  0.535    0.398  0.426  
T-test  -12.489***    -4.082***  
STDR Mean  0.401  0.435    0.353  0.372  
T-test  -7.557***    -3.006***  
LTDR Mean  0.077  0.100    0.045  0.054  
T-test  -8.036***    -2.961***  
BR Mean  0.231  0.234    0.188  0.186  
T-test  -0.785    0.337  
Ownership structures       
Largest Mean  0.457  0.375    0.379  0.324  
T-test  19.973***    8.990***  
Top Mean  0.142  0.129    0.195  0.170  
T-test  4.317***      4.951***  
Panel B Regression results of SOEs before and after the share split reform 
Variable LEV STDR LTDR BR 
 Before After Before After Before After Before After 
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C -0.613  -0.546  -0.014  0.210  -0.597  -0.755  -0.180  -0.453  
 0.000  0.000  0.827  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.002  0.000  
LARGEST -0.284 *** 0.059*  -0.251***  0.112  -0.036  -0.052  -0.177**  0.148*  
 0.002  0.094  0.006  0.210  0.501  0.359  0.028  0.052  
LARGEST2 0.118  -0.264**  0.128  -0.278**  -0.007 0.012  -0.009  -0.379***  
 0.248  0.015  0.197  0.013  0.896  0.857  0.917  0.000  
TOP -0.030  -0.033  -0.036  -0.081***  0.003  0.046**  -0.099***  -0.077***  
 0.282  0.264  0.187  0.007  0.850  0.016  0.000  0.003  
INDEX -0.001  -0.004***  0.001  -0.002*  -0.003***  -0.002**  -0.001  0.001  
 0.238  0.001  0.387  0.083  0.000  0.024  0.499  0.921  
ASSET -0.066***  -0.059***  -0.263***  -0.200***  0.195***  0.139***  0.144***  0.209***  
 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
TAX 0.139***  -1.077***  0.060***  -0.685***  0.078***  -0.392**  0.062***  -1.326***  
 0.000  0.000  0.001  0.004  0.000  0.011  0.000  0.000  
SIZE 0.137***  0.125***  0.068***  0.037***  0.069***  0.088***  0.053***  0.069***  
 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
ROA -1.029***  -0.493***  -0.895***  -0.414***  -0.132***  -0.078***  -0.780***  -0.301***  
 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000  
R2 0.242  0.192  0.266  0.133  0.292  0.227  0.193  0.207  
F-stat 82.083  65.212  93.303  41.870  106.012  80.318  61.520  71.473  
Panel C The regression results of Non-SOEs before and after the share split reform 
Variable LEV STDR LTDR BR 
 Before After Before After Before After Before After 
C -0.924  -1.005  -0.594  -0.479  -0.330  -0.528  -0.389  -0.509  
 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
LARGEST -0.104  0.091  0.027 0.313***  -0.129  -0.222*** -0.173*  -0.071  
 0.476  0.445  0.840  0.008  0.144  0.000  0.055  0.438  
LARGEST2 0.008 -0.099  -0.125  -0.415***  0.130  0.315***  0.062  0.004  
 0.963  0.536  0.455  0.009  0.100  0.000  0.676  0.974  
TOP -0.047  -0.039  -0.079**  -0.097**  0.032*  0.058***  -0.089**  -0.116***  
 0.282  0.323  0.049  0.012  0.087  0.001  0.014  0.000  
INDEX -0.001  -0.000  0.001  0.001  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  0.000  
 0.659  0.931  0.823  0.445  0.147  0.065*  0.541  0.861  
ASSET -0.081***  -0.044*  -0.178***  -0.099***  0.096***  0.055***  0.116***  0.151***  
 0.002  0.064  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
TAX -0.057  -0.699**  0.286  -0.471  -0.340  -0.227  -1.430***  -1.673***  
 0.909  0.040  0.545  0.162  0.127  0.149  0.001  0.000  
SIZE 0.156***  0.157*** 0.114***  0.091***  0.041***  0.065***  0.070***  0.077***  
 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
ROA -0.657***  -0.383***  -0.730***  -0.296***  0.072  -0.086***  -0.351***  -0.140***  
 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.119  0.000  0.001  0.000  
STATEMI 0.066***  0.053***  0.054***  0.034***  0.012***  0.019***  0.034***  0.018**  
 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.004  0.000  0.000  0.011  
R2 0.217  0.232  0.212  0.126  0.131  0.196  0.165  0.199 
F-stat 25.017  35.577  24.364  17.072  13.570  28.608  17.823  29.258  
Notes: LEV, STDR, LTDR, BR, LARGEST, LARGEST2, TOP, ASSET, TAX, 
SIZE, ROA and STATEMI have the same meaning as described in the notes to Table 
3 and Table 4. 
The year dummies and industry dummies are included in each regression, but not 
reported. 
Before and after columns present the regression results before and after the share split 
reform respectively, using LEV, STDR, LTDR and BR as dependent variables. 
Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below coefficients; p-values are 
displayed in italics. 
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Conclusions  
 
This paper investigates the effect of ownership structure on the leverage decision of 
both SOEs and non-SOEs in China. Our results indicate that state control and 
ownership structure have different influences on the leverage decision of Chinese 
SOEs and non-SOEs. We first show that state ownership is positively associated with 
firm leverage, and then show that SOEs in regions with a poor institutional 
environment have higher leverage ratios, especially a higher long-term debt ratio, 
than SOEs in regions with a better institutional environment. We found that political 
connections are important for non-SOEs to secure bank loans. The largest 
shareholding has a negative relationship with the leverage ratios of SOEs, while a 
non-linear relationship exists with the short-term and long-term debt ratio non-SOEs. 
The results also show that the improvement of institutional environment and the share 
split reform can either weaken the negative relationship or strengthen the positive 
relationship between largest shareholding and leverage of both SOEs and Non-SOEs 
to some extent.  
Overall, our results suggest that the financing behaviour of Chinese Non-SOEs 
is more market oriented. Chinese SOEs have a quite different financing behaviour 
from the firms in Western countries, due to the influence and prevalence of 
government intervention. However, the share split reform and a better institutional 
environment is helpful to reduce the agency conflict between largest shreholder and 
minority sharehoders, and improve the corporate governance quality of Chinese 
firms. Therefore, policies that aim to reduce the government intervention and the 
ownership concentration, and encourge the development of the institutional 
environment are necessary to diversify the financial sources of Chinese listed firms, 





1. Prior to the split-share structure reform, domestic A shares were divided into non-
tradable and tradable shares. Non-tradable shareholders represent the government, 
hold roughly a two-thirds majority, and manage the firms, while tradable 
shareholders have little power to affect the decisions made by non-tradable 
shareholders. The reform requires all the non-tradable shareholders have to pay 
compensation to tradable shareholders to convert those non-tradable shares to 
tradable share. Therefore, the reform can reduce state ownership, ownership 
concentration, and also align the interest between large and minority shareholders 
better. 
2. Prior research tends to use survey data of non-listed firms (Li et al. 2009; Firth et 
al. 2009). However, no literature mainly focuses on the comparison between SOEs 
and Non-SOEs. 
3. Recent literature suggests that a firm’s financing behaviours are shaped by the 
legal systems and financial environments across countries (la Porta et al., 1998; 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 2003). According to this 
body of research, an efficiently operating legal and financial system can reduce 
problems of opportunism and asymmetric information, and have a significant effect 
on the relative magnitude of the costs and benefits associated with debt. Evidence 
also increasingly indicates that firms’ capital structures also vary across different 
regions within a single country (Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Guiso, 2004). 
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4. This is because financial firms tend to have their own capital structure, due to their 
specific financial character. 
5. We used robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the provincial level. 
Robust standard errors are much larger than conventional estimates, which assume 
independence across firm-year observations and standard errors only assuming 
autocorrelation within the same firm. Therefore, so our significance tests are not 
inflated by the large number of firm-year observations in our sample. Year dummies 
are included in all specifications to capture temporal effects. 
6. Our regression results include the coefficients for various variables, but we focus 
only on the results related to our hypotheses. 
7. The eastern region covers: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong and Hainan. The central and west regions 
include: Shanxi, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Inner 
Mongolia, Guangxi, Sichuan, Chongqing, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, 
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Appendix A. Detailed description of the marketization index 
The marketization index is compiled by the National Economic Research Institute (Fan et al., 
2009), a comprehensive index that captures the regional market development of the following 
aspects: 
(1) Relationship between government and markets: 
a. The role of markets in allocating resources using the ratio of government spending to GDP. 
b. The level of tax burden on rural residents using the ratio of farmer families’ tax bills to 
their annual income. 
c. The role of government in business using the ratio of total hours firm managers spent 
dealing with government and government officials to their total working hours. 
d. The level of enterprise burden in addition to normal taxes using the ratio of non-tax levies 
to sales. 
e. The size of government using the ratio of employment by the central and local government, 
and various social organizations to population. 
(2) Development of nonstate sector in the economy: 
a. The ratio of industrial output by the private sector to total industrial output. 
b. The ratio of capital investment by the private sector to total capital investment. 
c. The ratio of employment by the private sector to total employment. 
(3) Development of product markets: 
a. The extent to which prices are set by market demand andsupply. 
i. The extent to which prices of retail merchandises are set by market demand and 
supply. 
ii. The extent to which prices of production factors are set by market demand and 
supply. 
iii. The extent to which prices of farm products are set by market demand and supply. 
b. The extent of regional trade barriers using the ratio of number of trade barriers to GDP. 
(4) Development of factor markets: 
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a. Banking development. 
i. Competitiveness of the banking sector using the ratio of deposits taken by non-state 
financial institutions to total deposits. 
ii. The extent to which banks employ economic criteria in their capital allocation using 
the ratio of short-term loans to the non-state sector (such as agricultural loans, loans to 
village/township enterprises, loans to private enterprises, and loans to foreign-owned enterprises) 
to total short-term loans. 
b. Foreign direct investment (FDI) using the ratio of FDI to GDP. 
c. Mobility of labor using the ratio of employment provided by migrant workers to total 
employment. 
d. Commercialization of technological innovation using the ratio of volume of technological 
transfers to employment by the technology sector. 
(5) Development of market intermediaries and legal environment: 
a. Development of marketintermediaries. 
i. The ratio of number of lawyers to population. 
ii. The ratio of registered accountants to population. 
b. Protection of producers’ legal rights using the ratio of number of economic crimes to GDP. 
c. Protection of property rights. 
i. The average number of patents applied per engineer. 
ii. The average number of patents approved per engineer. 
d. Protection of consumer rights using the ratio of number of consumer complaints received 
by the Consumer Association to GDP. 
In summary, the marketization index consists of 23 components. The year of 1999 is used as 
the base year, and the minimum and maximum values for each component are specified to be 0 
and 10, respectively. Values of each component in other years are normalized by the 
corresponding base year values. The final marketization index is an arithmetic average of these 23 
components. It is worth noting that using the principal components analysis to determine the 
weights on each of the 23 components leads to no major difference in the relative ranking of 
regions (Li et al., 2009).  
 
Appendix B. Descriptive statistics for marketization index 
Province 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Beijing 5.15 4.89 3.95 4.64 6.17 6.92 7.5 8.19 8.48 8.96 9.55 
Tianjin 4.53 4.92 4.71 5.36 6.59 6.73 7.03 7.86 8.41 9.18 9.76 
Hebei 4.98 5.21 4.66 4.81 4.93 5.29 5.59 6.05 6.61 6.93 7.11 
Shanxi 3.34 3.61 3.32 3.39 3.4 3.93 4.63 5.13 5.28 5.84 6.23 
Inner Mongolia 2.55 2.93 3.41 3.59 3.53 4 4.39 5.12 5.74 6.28 6.4 
Liaoning 4.58 4.64 4.47 4.76 5.47 6.06 6.61 7.36 7.92 8.18 8.66 
Jilin 3.51 3.57 3.97 3.96 4 4.29 4.69 5.49 6.06 6.44 6.93 
Heilongjiang 2.73 3.31 3.57 3.7 3.73 4.09 4.45 5.05 5.69 5.93 6.27 
Shanghai 5 5.04 4.7 5.75 7.62 8.34 9.35 9.81 10.25 10.79 11.71 
jiangsu 5.25 5.38 5.73 6.08 6.83 7.4 7.97 8.63 9.35 9.8 10.55 
Zhejiang 6.17 6.41 5.87 6.57 7.64 8.37 9.1 9.77 10.22 10.8 11.39 
Anhui 4.42 4.39 4.67 4.7 4.75 4.95 5.37 5.99 6.84 7.29 7.73 
Fujian 5.43 5.7 5.79 6.53 7.39 7.63 7.97 8.33 8.94 9.17 9.45 
Jiangxi 3.93 4.41 3.9 4.04 4 4.63 5.06 5.76 6.45 6.77 7.29 
Shandong 4.8 5.19 5.15 5.3 5.66 6.23 6.81 7.52 8.44 8.42 8.81 
Henan 4.82 5.09 4.05 4.24 4.14 4.3 4.89 5.64 6.73 7.07 7.42 
Hubei 4.24 4.69 4.01 3.99 4.25 4.65 5.47 6.11 6.86 7.12 7.4 
Hunan 4.73 5.09 3.98 3.86 3.94 4.41 5.03 6.11 6.75 6.98 7.19 
Guangdong 6.29 6.47 5.96 7.23 8.18 8.63 8.99 9.36 10.18 10.55 11.04 
Guangxi 4.22 4.29 4.39 4.29 3.93 4.75 5 5.42 6.04 6.12 6.37 
Hainan 4.6 4.51 4.7 4.75 5.66 5.09 5.03 5.41 5.63 6.35 6.88 
Chongqing 4.28 4.39 4.57 4.59 5.2 5.71 6.47 7.2 7.35 8.09 8.1 
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Sichuan 4.24 5.37 4.07 4.41 5 5.35 5.85 6.38 7.04 7.26 7.66 
Guizhou 2.89 3.2 3.29 3.31 2.95 3.04 3.67 4.17 4.8 5.22 5.57 
Yunnan 2.7 2.89 3.47 4.08 3.82 3.8 4.23 4.81 5.27 5.72 6.15 
Tibet NA NA NA 0 0.33 0.63 0.79 1.55 2.64 2.89 4.25 
Shanxi 3.03 3.45 2.94 3.41 3.37 3.9 4.11 4.46 4.81 5.11 5.36 
gansu 3.01 3.36 3.61 3.31 3.04 3.05 3.32 3.95 4.62 4.95 5.31 
Qinghai 1.29 1.49 2.15 2.49 2.37 2.45 2.6 3.1 3.86 4.24 4.64 
Ningxia 1.69 2.01 2.86 2.82 2.7 3.24 4.24 4.56 5.01 5.24 5.85 
Xinjiang 1.77 2 1.72 2.67 3.18 3.41 4.26 4.76 5.23 5.19 5.36 
 
